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On quantitative methods in the social sciences 
A d iscuss ion of quantitative methods in the social sciences - what kind of 
discourse i s th i s ? History of science? Philosophy of science? Science i t s e l f ? 
Levels of discourse need to be dist inguished i f confusion i s to be avoided. 
Of use here is Radnitzky 's suggestion that the enterprise of metascience should 
tack inter a l i a between the following perspectives: 
(A) One may study the l og i ca l , semantical, information-theoretical and epistemo-
logical aspects of symbolic systems and tools. 
(B) Or, one may take a 'genet ic ' perspective and concentrate on the whole production-
and-product system. 
(C) Or, one may want to include man, the agent in the picture: the producers and 
users of sc ient i f i c knowledge are viewed in a sc ience- in-society perspective.... 
(E) Eventually, one may ask what science means for man, and furthermore evaluate 
i t s impact from a futurological point of view ( ' c r i t i c a l ' perpective).1 
Different sorts of questions about quantitative methods are associated with the 
different perspectives. I shall present discuss ion under three heads, the par-
t icu lar questions asked being as follows: 
(A) Should the casting of theories in quantified form serve as an ideal for the 
social sciences? 
(B) what sort of advantages might quantitative methods confer when they penetrate 
a particular social science? 
(C/E) Does the increasing use of quantitative methods lead to greater social control? 
The f i r s t question i s worth discussing because of the great influence of what 
Radnitzky ca l l s the ' log ica l empir ic ists ' (which comprise Logical P o s i t i v i s t s , 
Popperians, Ordinary Language Philosophers and Pragmatists) on the philosophy of 
science in the Anglo-Saxon world. They have been more concerned either with 
general philosophy of science or with the philosophy of natural sciences than 
with the philosophy of the social sciences, but have nonetheless developed two 
alternative posit ions with respect to the latter: 
(A) 'One position ... i s that because existing human sciences do not meet the 
formal adequacy c r i te r ia related to the models of explanation,of concept formation, 
etc., that art iculate the Ideal of Unified Science, these d i s c ip l i nes eo ipso 
lack ' s c i e n t i f i c i t y ' ; they are more artes than sc ient i f i c d i sc ip l i nes and hence 
may be and should be ignored by logical empir ic i s t s . ' 
- 2 -
(B) 'Those who apply the Unified-Science-idea also to the cultural sciences 
wi l l recommend even there the patterning of these f i e ld s upon ( ideal ised) physics; 
th i s could involve bringing them as near as possible to applied mathematics by 
developing postulational systems with psychological interpretation, with socio-
logical interpretation, etc., as the case may be. Only by following th i s re-
commendation may the cultural sciences too hope to become respectable. This 
recommendation has found a sympathetic hearing among social s c ient i s t s in the 
English-speaking world and also in Scandinavia. Many of them have become not only 
sympathisers of logical empiricism (by accepting i t s v i s i on of science) but also 
users of logical empiricism - by trying to u t i l i z e i t s theories, e.g., i t s theories 
of empirical s ignif icance, of operational def in i t ions , of the ' v e r i f i c a t i on ' of 
hypotheses etc. ' 2 
Social sc ient i s t s of persuasion (B) are under pressure from at least three direct ions: 
( i ) Paradoxes have appeared within the logical empiricist framework i t s e l f . Some 
of these have emerged as logical empir icists have tr ied to specify the conditions 
for sc ient i f i c explanation. They have not yet been adequately dealt with as i s 
evidenced by an example cited by Woodward: 'Consider the general isat ion 'A l l men 
who take birth control p i l l s regular ly, won't get pregnant.' This general isat ion 
i s universal in scope and supports counterfactuals. I t seems to sa t i s f y the usual 
syntactic conditions for law-l ikeness. Can i t be used to explain why Mr. Jones, 
a man who has been taking birth control p i l l s regular ly, f a i l s to get pregnant? ... 
I think i t i s clear that ( th i s ) i s a defective explanation ... This is of course 
reflected in the fact that even i f Mr. Jones stopped taking birth control p i l l s , 
he s t i l l would not get pregnant. Given that Mr. Jones is a man, whether or not 
he takes birth control p i l l s , has, as we say, 'nothing to do' with whether or 
not hp qets pregnant. '3 So we've got to load on another re s t r i c t i on , perhaps of 
a type not eas i ly reconci l iable with the logical empiricist framework. This sort of 
d i f f i c u l t y points to d i f f i c u l t i e s with logical empir ic ist postulates themselves. 
( i i ) Radnitzky points out that for logical empiricism 'phys ics , as we know i t , 
i s a sort of touchstone: i f not even physics, which among existing d i sc ip l ines was 
considered to approximate the ideal empirical science most c lose ly , does f u l f i l 
the adequacy c r i te r ia for the appraisal of f inished products (theories etc.) then the 
ideal i t s e l f , the ideal of unif ied science as explicated, i s thereby demasked 
as Utopian. ' 4 I f Feyerabend is r i ght , then just this state of a f fa i r s exists: 
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1 My aim in the lectures (which were the basis for Against Method was to show 
that some very simple and plausible rules and standards which both philosophers 
and sc ient i s t s regarded as essential parts of r a t i ona l i t y were violated in 
the course of episodes ( Copernican Revolution; triumph of the kinetic theory; 
r i se of quantum theory; and so on) they regarded as equally essent ia l . More 
spec i f i ca l l y , I tr ied to show (a) that the rules (standards) were actual ly violated 
and that the more perceptive sc ient i s t s were aware of the v io la t ions ; and (b) that 
they had to be violated. Insistence on the rules would not have improved matters, 
i t would have arrested p rog res s . ' 5 
( i i i ) In the f i e ld of the social sciences, logical empir ic ist metascience has to 
compete with hermeneutic-dialectic metascience. Hermeneutic-dialectic metascience 
has the advantage that i t has been developed spec i f i ca l l y for and with human sciences, 
whereas logical empiricism has dealt with them only tangential ly. Habermas, writing 
in the hermeneutic-dialectic t radit ion suggests that there are three knowledge-
const itut ive interests relevant to the social sciences: the technical, the hermeneutic 
and the emancipatory. The manipulation of the environment, physical and soc ia l , i s 
a technical interest. The hermeneutic interest i s 'the interest in intersubjective 
mediation of participatory understanding with respect to possible meaning of actions 
or of texts etc. that connect contemporaries and that pass between the past and 
present generations. This is an interest in the conceptual avai l ing of possible 
ways of l i v i ng . Thus i t includes also the interest in improving one's self-under-
standing , which in turn i s (d ia lect i ca l l y ) mediated by understanding of o the r s . ' 6 
The emancipatory interest ' involves the conscious drawing up from an ethical base 
of plans, strategies and po l i t i ca l l ines and acting with these as guides in concrete 
s i tuat ions ... I t concerns the emancipation, through enlightenment, from the quasi-
natural forces of history and society. The type of intel lectual ac t i v i t y i t entai l s 
i s c r i t i c i sm, which sets the consciousness free from i t s dependence upon hypostatized 
forces, because i t reveals the real forces and f ac i l i t a te s their steering and con t ro l . ' 7 
Logical empiricism would confine social science to the technical 'moment' only: 
'thereby i t forces the practice of l i f e (lebenspraxis ) ent i re ly into the confines 
of the functioning of instrumental action: technical success becomes the only secure 
standard; and with i t technocracy the s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g , se l f - re inforc ing hidden image 
of man and soc ie ty . ' 8 
Where have we got? I t is logical empiricism that suggests that the casting of theories 
in quantified form should serve as an ideal for the social sciences. But I have 
suggested reasons (internal d i f f i c u l t i e s , problems of appl icat ion, dangerous l im i t -
ations of scope) for doubting the soundness of logical empir ic ist metascience 
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especial ly in respect of social science. To the extent that these reasons ar^; cogent, 
the quantif ication ideal is dethroned. This i s not to say that quanti f icat ion i s 
ent irely inappropriate in the social sciences - a study of economics or demography 
wil l show that i t has an important part to play at the technical level . And since 
we are concerned with language in hermeneutics, the entry of mathematics into 
l i n gu i s t i c s may mean that mathematics has a small role to play at th is level . 
But i t does mean that cases wil l have to be judged on their merits. 
I I 
Quantitative methods have not penetrated the te r r i to r i e s of the various social sciences 
at the same time or to the same degree. One f i e ld where the quantitative revolution 
i s f a i r l y recent is h istory. I f the battle i s over, the guns have not long ceased 
to smoke and one s t i l l encounters a certain amount of counterrevolutionary guer i l l a 
ac t i v i t y . On the assumption that l i f e i s more exciting on the f ront ie r , therefore, 
I shall draw my examples from the cliometric l i terature? 
Is history a social science? I f i t is not, d i scuss ion here of cl iometric examples 
i s off the point. Liberation of our minds from the logical empir ic ist s t ra i t jacket 
helps us to answer this question in the pos i t ive. At the technical level one may 
note that h istor ians, with increasing frequency, apply the methods of say, economics 
and demography to bodies of h i stor ica l data, i .e. they are employing social s c i en t i f i c 
techniques. But many histor ians have chosen to deny that their d i s c ip l i ne i s a 
social science on the grounds that they wish to preserve the hermeneutic level i .e. 
the function of history which seeks to interpret times past for the current generation. 
Implied here i s a logical empir icist view of science which excludes hermeneutics. On 
the hermeneutic-dialectic view the existence of a well-developed hermerieutic level 
makes history perhaps the paradigm social science. 
What new opportunities do quantitative methods (including the use of computers) offer 
h istor ians? Let ' s discuss th is under two heads: 
A. High speed data processing and descriptive s t a t i s t i c s 
High speed data processing offers the opportunity of 'the analys i s of those vast 
deposits of documents, containing v i ta l data, but whose sheer bulk has now daunted 
al l researchers ' 9 . And so we f ind the 1427 land register of Florence being sub-
jected to analys is for the f i r s t time, computer programmes being written to remove 
the chore of reconstitution of famil ies by card index from the work of histor ical 
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demographers and a time ser ies of Par is ian rents from the f i fteenth to the 
seventeenth centuries being calculated, just to c i te the examples Ladurie adduces.10 
There are implications of th is for methodology: 
(a) As Furet points out: 'The h i s t o r i an ' s use of computers . . . i s . . . a very useful 
theoretical d i s c ip l i ne , in that the formalization of a documentary ser ies which i s 
to be programmed forces the histor ian from the very beginning to abandon epistemo-
logical na'ivete, to construct the actual object of his research, to scrut in i se 
his hypotheses, and to make the trans i t ion from impl ic i t to e x p l i c i t . ' 1 1 
(b) There i s a s h i f t of interest from the event to ser ies and structure. An account 
of the de s i r ab i l i t y of th is change i s given by Furet: 'S ince the event, a sudden 
irruption of the unique and the new into the concatenation of time, cannot be com-
pared to any antecedent, the only way of intetgrat ing i t into h istory i s to give 
i t a technical meaning ... (On the other hand) the ser ies reveals a time which i s 
no longer the mysterious occasional spurt of the event, but an evolutionary rhythm 
which is measurable, comparable, and doubly d i f ferent ia l in that i t can be examined 
within one series or as between two or more. ' 1 2 
Quantitative methods and computers can be applied to certain sorts of h i s tor ica l 
problem; as these come to be discussed they have their impact on practices in the 
rest of the f i e l d . 
Of course quantitative methods do not do i t a l l for us as a d iscuss ion of Example 
I wil l show: 
Example I - Hermeneutics and the Bennet Barrow Whipping Diary 
One of the questions that have been debated by h istor ians of slavery in the United 
States i s the question of how severe exploitation of slaves was. Relevant to th i s 
question is a discussion of the re lat ive prevalence of pos i t ive and negative labour 
incentives under slavery. One of the negative labour incentives was whipping. How 
important was th i s ? 
Fogel and Engerman approach the problem as follows: 
'Rel iable data on the frequency of whipping i s extremely sparse. The only systematic 
record of whipping now avai lable for an extended period comes from the diary of 
Bennet Barrow, a Louisiana planter who believed that to spare the r id was to spoil 
the slave. His plantation numbered about 200 s laves, of whom 120 were in the labour 
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force. The record shows that over the course of two years a total of 160 whippings 
were administered, an average of 0.7 whippings per hand per year. About half the 
hands were not whipped at a l l during the pe r i od . ' 1 3 
What are we to make of th is average? I t seems to inv i te a physical interpretation; 
i f we assume that the quantum of pain actual ly administered determines the social 
s ignif icance of the in s t i tu t ion of whipping, then we may be incl ined to conclude 
that whipping was a re lat ive ly unimportant negative labour incentive. 
Gutman, in his cr i t ique of Fogel and Engerman, argues otherwise: 'Southern law 
permitted slaveowners to punish their chattel, and most h istor ians agree that 
whipping served as the most common form of physical punishment, f igur ing as a 
central device in imposing order over troublesome slaves and in revealing the 
source of authority in a slave society. The essential s t a t i s t i c , therefore, i s 
not the average number of whippings per hand per year. I t i s much more relevant 
to know how often the whip was used ... In 1840-41, Barrow's slaves were whipped 
160 times. A slave - 'on average' - was whipped every 4.56 days ... (This i s a) 
quite high average and for good reason. I f whipping i s viewed primarily as an instrument 
of labour d i sc ip l ine and not as the mere exercise of arb i t rary power (or cruelty) , 
whipping three slaves every two weeks means that th i s instrument of physical d i s c ip l i ne 
had an adequate social v i s i b i l i t y among the enslaved. Slave men and women were whipped 
frequently enough ... to reveal to them (and to us) that whipping regularly served 
Barrow as a negative instrument of labour d i s c ip l i ne . 1 
Gutman's cr i t ique moves at the hermeneutic level when he exp l i c i t l y considers the 
question: 'What did whippings mean to s laves? ' I f one i s dealing with incentives, 
one has to deal with meaning. He argues that the effect of each whipping, far from 
being confined to the physical pain of the slaves d i rect ly involved, extended to a l l 
slaves on the plantation in that i t 'revealed the source of authority in a slave 
society 1. This i s far more plausible than the view impl ic i t in Fogel and Engerman 
and so Gutman's cr i t ique succeeds. 
Note that in both analyses an elementary s t a t i s t i c was calculated and interpreted. 
The one based on sound hermeneutic work carr ies weight;the other based on defective 
interpretation does not. 
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B. Models 
Another opportunity offered by quantitative methods i s that of model bui lding. 
B r ie f l y a mathematical model cons i s ts of a set of equations containing parameters, 
exogenous variables (var iables set outside the model) and endogenous variables 
(variables whose values are determined by the equation set) . Economists use such 
models incessantly. In h i s tor ica l work users of models can do two things: 
( i ) They can explain observed values of the endogenous variables by referring to 
values of exogenous variables and parameters and to the mechanism represented by 
the model. 
( i i ) They can calculate what the values of the endogenous variables might have 
been had values of exogenous variables and/or parameters been d i f ferent, the model 
i t s e l f remaining the same. This involves counterfactuals, aspects of which are 
discussed in Example 2. 
Example 2 - Counterfactuals and the price of slaves in the U.S. South in 1890 
Was the American c i v i l war necessary for the abol i t ion of s lavery? 'Many w r i t e r s ' , 
observe Fogel and Engerman, 'have been convinced that slavery would have been 
extinguished even in the absence of a C iv i l War because of the natural geographic 
l imits to which the cotton culture was confined, and because of the pressure 
generated by r i s i ng urbanization . . . The 'natural l im i t s ' thesis holds that the 
r i se in ratio of slave labour to land eventually would have reduced the value of 
a slave to less than his subsistence cost. The r i se in the labour-to-land rat io 
seemed assured, since the land suitable for cotton was limited while the supply of 
labour was bound to grow with the growth of the slave population. The c i t i e s would 
not have provided an outlet for th is excess because the c i t i e s were a host i le 
environment, an environment in which slavery could not p e r s i s t . ' 1 5 
Fogel and Engerman develop, using the framework of supply and demand ana lys i s , an 
equation which 'enables one to predict the change in slave prices, given information 
on the cotton prices, the output of cotton, the size of the labour force employed 
in cotton, the cost of slave maintenance, and the market rate of interest. The 
values of a l l these variables for the post-Civ i l War era are known - except the 
rate of growth of the slave labour force that would have been employed in cotton 
production and the cost of slave maintenance. However, the unknown values are supplied 
by the natural l imits thesis i t s e l f ... The results of the test . . . show that far 
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from f a l l i n g , the prices of slaves would have r i sen . . . Prime hands in 1890 would 
have sold at 52 percent more than they did in 1860 ' . 1 6 
This argunrent c lear ly involves a counterfactual: Had slavery not been abolished, 
the price of slaves in 1890 would have been higher than in 1860. Now counterfactuals 
ra ise enormous technical problems in the f i e l d of log ic ; as far as I can t e l l , 
resolution of these is not in prospect. Yet counterfactuals are c lear ly part of 
h istor ical discourse - they do not appear only in the writ ings of c l iometr ic ians. 
By way of i l l u s t ra t i on of th is assert ion, a couple of examples from S i r Llewellyn 
Woodward, The Age of Reform 1815-1870, 0UP, 1938 (revised edit ion 1962): 
p.4. !.. The changes ( in productive technique) could not have taken place on a large 
scale i f there had not been corresponding progress in agr icu l ture, in methods of 
transport, in the organisation of trade and the d i f fus ion of c red i t . ' 
p.22. 'Even i f there had been f a c i l i t i e s for carrying out a well-planned admin-
i s t ra t i ve pol icy, the central author it ies were unl ikely to do anything unless 
parliament called upon them to act, and parliament would remain unresponsive to 
public opinion of a moderate kind as long as the house of commons did not properly 
represent the people of England.' 
So histor ians should perhaps try to specify c r i t e r i a for assessing when there are 
reasonable grounds for asserting a counterfactual. Two are suggested: 
(a) The counterfactual should have some bearing on what actual ly happened. This 
condition i s sa t i s f ied by Fogel and Engerman - the 'pr ice of slaves in 1890' has 
to do with the necessity for the American C iv i l War. 
(b) The counterfactual should be the outcome of a model or argument whose general 
form with different i n i t i a l conditions supports actual events. This condition i s 
a lso sa t i s f ied - supply and demand models are frequently used to explain observed 
prices. 
Fogel and Engerman's achievement, then, i s to provide grounds for rejecting the 
'natural l im i t s ' thesis and so furthering the debate about American slavery. Their 
model-building exercise appears to have been worthwhile. 
Quantitative methods in history increase the number of poss ible directions of research. 
They also modify traditional practices. Are these not marks of f ru i t fu l progress? 
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I I I 
A great many people see the computer as the symbol of the technocratic society 
they l i ve in. This i s by no means entirely i r r a t i ona l . In the United States your 
credit rating i s stored on computer by anonymous c lerks ; in West Germany your 
status as a possible te r ro r i s t i s fed into a state computer by an anonymous o f f i c i a l . 
These information networks serve one purpose - that of control. 
Such networks could well be the object of social s c i en t i f i c invest igat ion. They 
are not, however, the product of social science. Social s c i en t i s t s who use the computer 
are not necessari ly involved in building up control networks. Social sc ient i s t s who 
do not use the computer may very well be so involved. I t i s Chomsky's concern in 
his essay on 'Object iv ity and Liberal Scholarship ' to expose th i s aspect of ' the 
developing ideology of a new privi leged e l i t e . ' He discusses an exponent of th is 
ideology in the following terms: 
'Various strands of th i s ideology are drawn together in a recent a r t i c l e by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski in which a number of the conceptions and attitudes that appear in recent 
social thought are summarized - I am tempted to say 'parodied. ' Brzezinski ... sees 
a 'profound change' taking place in the intel lectual community, as 'the largely 
humanist-oriented, occasionally ideolog ica l ly minded inte l lectua l -d i s senter , who 
sees his role largely in terms of preferring social c r i t iques , i s rapidly being 
displaced either by experts and spec ia l i s t s , who become involved in special govern-
ment undertakings, or by the genera l i s t s - integrators , who become in effect house 
ideologues for those in power, providing overall intel lectual integration for 
disparate act ions . ' ... I t would hardly be rewarding to try to disentangle 
Brzez insk i ' s confusions and misunderstandings. What i s interest ing, rather, i s 
the way his dim awareness of current developments in science and technology i s used 
to provide an ideological j u s t i f i c a t i on for the ' increasing role in the key decis ion-
making inst i tut ions of indiv iduals with special intel lectual and s c ien t i f i c at ta in-
ments' based in the univers i ty, 'the creative eye of the massive communications 
complex. '17 Note that B rzez in sk i ' s mode of argument i s not defective science 
no defective technology but defective ethics; such an argument can only hope 
to persuade in an environment of value-free po s i t i v i s t social science where the 
capacities of i t s practit ioners for ethical argument have atrophied. 
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Let ' s take another example - th i s time closer to home. In August 1979, M011er 
and Schlemmer presented a paper entitled 'A lternat ives to urbanisation: The 
preferences and orientation of migrant workers in a South African c i t y ' to a Work-
shop on Rural Development held by the Urban Foundation. Leave aside the question 
of whether a consideration of alternatives to (African) urbanisation i s not just 
the kind of topic the South African state would l i ke to see social sc ient i s t s 
g iv ing attention to, and consider the argument about a l ternat ives. The central 
f inding of the survey i s : 
'The increasingly r i g i d provis ions in terms of inf lux control l eg i s l a t i on in the 
seventies and mounting land densit ies have produced a clear majority of migrants 
who perceive no adequate security of tenure in either rural or urban areas. This 
implies a c r i t i ca l problem of morale affecting a very substantial proportion of 
the labour force. The problem i s urgent and growing. ' 1 8 
Note the use of the term 'morale ' . I t i s most often used by the army in referr ing 
to subjective factors affecting the wil l inqness of so ld iers to f i gh t hard or by 
business to refer to the wi l l ingness of workers to work hard. The army and business want 
you to be happy - but for their purposes. I s th i s unfair? Le t ' s read on: 
'Given the enormous s ize and pervasiveness of the migrant labour force, what 
Natal ... need(s) i s a type of development which wil l f a c i l i t a t e what most 
migrants in Durban appear to want: a secure non-city base, ease of contact with 
fami l ies, and opportunities for permanent or semi-permanent ' target work' in the 
c i ty or appropriate industr ial growth points ... I f adequate trac s of land could 
be added to KwaZulu near Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Richard ' s Bay and 
other growth points, and th i s land (as well as any other suitable land) could be 
planned from the outset as f a i r l y dense, re lat ive ly intensive, semi-economic, 
peri-urban garden-development schemes for 'commuter' migrants, then i t would 
represent a fa i r compromise between conf l ict ing needs ... I f such developments 
could emerge, the morale of migrants (who would become conmuters) would be greatly 
improved, the social costs of migrant labour would be minimised, a small source 
of vegetable production to serve c i ty markets could become avai lable, and the trend 
towards the very dense informal settlements and 'shack-farming' on the outsk i r ts 
of urban areas could be meaningfully combated. Above a l l , perhaps, the divided 
commitments of the typical Natal migrant worker could be accommodated in large 
measure, making a s ign i f i cant contribution to morale and po l i t i ca l s t ab i l i t y 
among large sections of the urban labour f o r ce . ' 1 9 
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Two new interests emerge here 
i 
- 'above a l l po l i t ica l s t ab i l i t y , interest ing ly not mentioned as. an i iterest among 
the migrant survey respondents at a l l . 
- the combating of the 'trend towards the very dense informal settlements ... 
on the outsk i r t s of urban areas. ' There does not seem to be evidence n the survey 
that th i s i s a migrant interest either; i t looks more l i ke the concern of the town-
planner and property owner. 
The distorted hermeneutic in th i s mainly technical study i s clear. We (academics, 
big businessmen) may achieve some understanding of the meaning-world of migrant 
labourers.from a study of th i s sort, but we are unable (within i t s l imit s ) to 
establ i sh communication with the objects of the study or enter into a dialogue 
with them. After a l l , we a ren ' t rea l l y interested, are we? As long as there i s 
'h igh morale' and ' po l i t i ca l s t a b i l i t y ' , that wi l l do. Radnitzky speaks t ru ly when 
he observes that for quas i -natura l i s t social science 'the ideal-type of the social 
sc ient i s t wil l be that of the s t rateg i s t , of the Machiavellian P r ince ' s Counse l lor . 1 2 0 
The purpose of these two examples i s to indicate that ass istance in the project of 
extending social control ar i ses from a defective social s c i en t i f i c practice (quas i -
naturalism) legitimated by a defective philosophy of social science ( logical em-
pir ic i sm). Whether one 's practice i s defective or not does not depend on whether one 
uses quantitative methods, though as we have seen, attempts are made to buttress 
social s c ient i f i c authority by a non-rational appeal to command of esoteric know-
ledge (including mathematics). An end to these attempts would l iberate quantitative 
methods from g u i l t by associat ion. Then more of us (the people) might become free 
real ly to understand Bertrand Russell when he wrote: 
'At the age of eleven, I began Eucl id, with my brother as a tutor. This was one of 
the great events of my l i f e , as dazzling as f i r s t love. I had not imagined that there 
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